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Herewith are State's comments and suggestions regarding the August 5, 1995 White House draft discussion paper: "Towards a Long-Term Solution to the Rwanda-Burundi Problem--August 1995"

After the sub-heading "U.S., Policy to Date", insert the following:

Our principal objectives have been to prevent humanitarian disasters in the region, support reconciliation and rehabilitation and work toward long-term stability in Rwanda and Burundi, including voluntary repatriation of refugees. Ultimately, this will require more democratic legal systems with minority rights protected, a solution to the refugee problem and other institutional changes.

After listing the six principal areas of U.S. policy add:
" 7." Work toward holding a comprehensive regional conference which may establish follow-on institutions as necessary.

Under the "Key Assumptions" heading, add the following:

The GOR will do what it perceives to be in its self-interest regardless of the views of the international community.
--Any solution to the Rwanda/Burundi crisis, and by implication, our ability to achieve our own objectives, will require French support or at least acquiescence.

Under Option # 1, either as part of the initial underlined sentence or as an explanatory following sentence, add the following:

"This is essentially a vigorous implementation of our existing policy, notably with respect to the impunity and refugee problems."

Regarding 1-a, we note that the Rwandan resolution to lift the arms embargo comes up for discussion in the Security Council on August 10.

Modify 1-b as follows: "Work closely with the GOR and the Tribunal to cull the names of the 400 or so most heinous genocide perpetrators/ issue arrest warrants. Encourage amnesty or other appropriate procedures for other arrested or accused individuals with a view to eliminating the excessive prisonpopulation and facilitating the handling of the worst offenders' cases." In the first tick, drop " by surprise".

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The Department believes 1-c is unrealistic. We doubt that the international community would support closing the camps absent a more enduring solution to the refugee problem. Domestically, such action could result in severe criticism of the Administration.

Regarding 1-d, the Department notes that U.S. policy in Zaire is to keep Mobutu focused on the transition. The issue for us is how to keep him focused on the transition, and to appropriately engage him in Rwanda/Burundi issues, where he might be helpful, without jeopardizing the internal transition in Zaire. Two tools we're presently using to keep Mobutu focused are political isolation and Presidential proclamation on visas. This policy has been coordinated with France and Belgium. The Carter Center has informed us that former President Carter may call Mobutu on matters related to Rwanda/Burundi, such as Zairian cooperation in moving the refugee camps.

Regarding Option # 2, the Department will distribute an AF draft outlining our views regarding a regional conference. In the first paragraph of the text of the White House paper, France should be included in the list of interested countries, and our desire to work especially closely with Belgium and France should be mentioned. The next paragraph should be dropped as both unworkable and antithetical to fundamental U.S. policies. We would like to discuss the next paragraph. We agree that those parties which do not cooperate should be ostracized and punished through the use of various measures as noted in the draft text. This may or may not entail suspension of assistance to specific governments.

We believe Option # 3, as stated, is a non-starter politically. We cannot envisage the international community accepting the "trusteeship" label. What is more likely, albeit expensive and not easy, is the Cambodia-like stewardship noted under Option # 2. Similarly, we may want to consider some resettlement arrangement for refugees a la the Southeast Asian boat people. This also may be too expensive and controversial to gain adequate support, although some in the Department favor the idea.

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